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Health mobility is a statistical measure of inter-temporal fluctuations in health of a group of 
individuals.   Increased  availability of panel  data has  led to  a number of studies  which 
analyse and compare health mobility across subgroups.  Mobility can differ systematically 
across patient subgroups, even if prevalence measured at one point in time is the same.  
There is a lack of discussion regarding whether health mobility is a relevant concept for 
resource allocation decisions.    In this  think piece, we  explore whether and how health 
mobility is incorporated in cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA).   
 
CEA  takes  health  mobility  into  account  where  it  matters  in  terms  of  efficiency  and  –
depending on treatment programs- either favours groups with low mobility or gives equal 
priority to groups of differing levels of mobility.  However, CEA fails to take into account 
the  equity  dimension  of  mobility.    There  is  qualitative  research  to  suggest  that  some 
members of the public find that patient groups with low health mobility should be given 
priority even if some efficiency was sacrificed.  Results also indicate that this may depend 
on  the  nature  of  the  condition,  the  actual  lengths  involved  and  the  magnitude  of  the 
efficiency sacrifice.   
 
Health  mobility  may  also  have  political  implications  which  affect  resource  allocation 
decisions, possibly in opposing directions.  Further research is required to investigate the 
extent to which the public is concerned with health mobility, to determine conditions for 
which health mobility matters most, and to explore ways of how the equity dimension of 
health mobility can be incorporated into CEA.   Health mobility: implications for efficiency and equity in priority setting       K Hauck, A Tsuchiya 
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Introduction 
 
Every  health  system  aspires  to  implement  health  policies  which  can  achieve  the  best 
possible  health  and  wellbeing  for  the  population.    This  requires  decisions  on  how  to 
allocate scarce resources among competing subgroups.  Such decisions are complicated by 
the fact that the health of individuals can change over time.  There is evidence that the 
extent of intertemporal changes, or „mobility‟, in health states can differ systematically 
across individuals or subgroups, even if prevalence measured at one point in time is the 
same.  The increased availability of panel data has led to a number of studies which analyse 
and compare health mobility for different subgroups (Buckley, Denton, Robb, & Spencer, 
2004; Contoyannis, Jones, & Rice, 2004a, b; Hauck & Rice, 2004; Hernandez-Quevedo, 
Jones,  Lopez-Nicolas,  &  Rice,  2006;  Jones  &  Lopez-Nicolas,  2004;  Kerkhofs  & 
Lindeboom, 1997; Pascual & Cantarero, 2009; Salas, 2002).  There is a lack of discussion, 
however, regarding whether health mobility is a relevant concept for resource allocation 
decision.  In this note, we explore the concept of „health mobility‟, and whether and how it 
is reflected in cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA).  We find that, while economic evaluation 
does take health mobility into account where it matters in terms of efficiency, it fails to take 
into account the equity dimension of mobility.   
 
Health mobility  
 
Cross sectional studies on population health are used to determine prevalence rates and to 
explain differences in these across subgroups, at a certain point in time.  For example, a 
study on the mental health of young Australians finds that 27% of 18-24 year olds suffer 
from a mental health disorder (ABS, 1998).  This might be due to each individual having a 
27% chance of suffering ill health, in any given year, or 27% suffering from ill health all 
the time (and 73% never) or - most realistically - something in between, so that of the 27%, 
(say) 10% will experience ill health in repeated time periods, and the rest (17%) are ill for 
one time period only.  The first scenario is characterized by high, the second by none, and 
the  third  by  some  intermediate  level  of  health  mobility  (some  use  the  term  health Health mobility: implications for efficiency and equity in priority setting       K Hauck, A Tsuchiya 
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dynamics).  Cross sectional data are not sufficient to inform on this intertemporal aspect of 
health.  Panel data need to be used to test the extent of health mobility, because it allows 
tracking individuals over time (Hsiao, 2003). 
 
As incidence and prevalence, health mobility is essentially a population concept, based on 
the aggregate health experiences of a number of individuals over several time periods.  As 
with incidence and prevalence, health mobility is determined by the proportion of healthy 
individuals  becoming  ill.    As  with  prevalence,  but  unlike  incidence,  health  mobility  is 
determined by the proportion of ill individuals who become healthy.  Unlike incidence or 
prevalence, health mobility reflects the number of consecutive periods individuals remain 
in one health state or the other.  In addition, unlike incidence or prevalence, health mobility 
can be used with two or more discrete levels of health states or with continuous health 
measures to reflect the magnitude of change in health states. 
 
A measure of mobility can collapse changes in health states over several time periods and 
over  several  individuals  into  a  single  summary  measure,  which  allows  comparison  of 
mobility across different subgroups over time.  Measures based on discrete health outcomes 
usually  rely  on  estimated  transition  probabilities,  i.e.  probabilities  of  moving  from  one 
health  state  to  the  other  over  time  (Buckley  et  al.,  2004;  Contoyannis  et  al.,  2004a; 
Hernandez-Quevedo  et  al.,  2006;  Pascual  &  Cantarero,  2009).    High/low  transition 
probabilities  are  indicative  of  high/low  mobility.    Measures  of  mobility  derived  from 
continuous health measures can be based on the extent of correlation in health states of 
individuals over time, with strong/weak correlation indicative of low/high mobility (Hauck 
&  Rice,  2004).    Alternatively,  mobility  measures  can  be  derived  from  the  estimated 
influence  of  previous  health  on  current  health  status,  with  a  small/large  influence  of 
previous health indicative of high/low mobility.  This requires specification of a dynamic 
panel data model with  one or several variables for previous health status  as regressors 
(Contoyannis et al., 2004a, b; Hauck & Rice, 2004; Kerkhofs & Lindeboom, 1997; Salas, 
2002).   
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Jones et al. (2006) review dynamic models and discuss the factors which influence health 
mobility.  To some extent health mobility may reflect the chronic nature of some illnesses.  
Also a cumulative history of a range of health problems may have a direct influence on 
current  health.    These  effects  can  be  thought  of  as  pure  dynamics,  often  termed  state 
dependence.  In addition, individuals may have certain characteristics (such as education, 
material deprivation, childhood nutrition or environmental factors) that predispose them to 
poorer health and that persist over time.  Some of these factors may be observable, but 
others – such as genetic predisposition, time preference and risk aversion – are generally 
difficult to measure.  
 
Health mobility and cost effectiveness 
 
Analysis of mental health in the UK shows that low income groups (LIG) and minority 
ethnic groups (MEG) experience similar levels of mental illness at a point in time (Hauck 
& Rice, 2004).  However,  LIG experience persistence in their illness, thus have lower 
health mobility, whereas individuals from MEG experience greater  fluctuations in their 
mental health and thus have higher health mobility.  Suppose a policy maker wants to 
implement preventive and curative mental health programs, targeted at both LIG and MEG.  
How should resources be allocated between the two groups?  Although the language of 
health mobility may not be established in the economic evaluation literature, clinical trial 
studies  are  in  effect  based  on  data  from  panel  or  cohort  studies,  and  therefore  the 
information on health mobility is already available.  If so, how is health mobility reflected 
in  conventional  CEA?  In  what  follows, we use  LIG and MEG as  shorthands for two 
equally-sized  population  subgroups  that  suffer  from  a  given  non-fatal  disease,  but  also 
demonstrate distinct levels of health mobility in and out of this disease. 
 
Suppose we are analysing the cost effectiveness of a program which cures all who are ill at 
t = 0.  We assume that costs are the same regardless of how long patients have had the 
condition for, or how long patients would have the condition for without treatment.  We 
also assume that marginal utility for surviving in a given health state is constant.  Both LIG Health mobility: implications for efficiency and equity in priority setting       K Hauck, A Tsuchiya 
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and MEG have the same level of prevalence at any point in time, but seen over several time 
periods, incidence, and therefore health mobility, are higher among the MEG.  This implies 
that the net benefit to the MEG will be lower than the benefit to the LIG.  While the number 
of patients at t = 0 are the same across the two groups, the patients from MEG would have 
recovered sooner without treatment than the patients from LIG, thus the average patient 
from MEG has a lower net benefit of treatment than the average LIG patient.  CEA gives 
higher priority to the LIG, thus reflecting the difference in mobility between these two 
groups.   
 
Now,  suppose  we  are  analysing  the  cost-effectiveness  of  a  prevention  program,  to  be 
implemented at t = 0, which reduces the incidence over the next n time periods to zero.  
The MEG has a higher level of incidence per period; however, each averted case would 
have lasted for a shorter duration.  Therefore, equal prevalence at any point in time means 
that at the end of the n time periods, benefits for the two groups will be the same.  Thus, the 
relative results of the CEAs will depend on the cost side.  If the prevention program is a 
complete public good so that the costs cannot be attributed to individual beneficiaries (e.g. 
air quality control to prevent respiratory conditions), then the overall CEA results are the 
same  for  LIG  and  MEG,  and  difference  in  health  mobility  does  not  affect  cost 
effectiveness.  However, if the prevention program is entirely a private good (e.g. a drug to 
prevent hypertension), then the costs are a function of the number of people treated.  MEG 
has a higher incidence, and therefore, to the extent that this means a larger number of 
people  need  to  receive  the  intervention  in  order  to  eliminate  incidence  over  the  target 
period, MEG will be associated with a higher cost of achieving the same health benefit as 
LIG. 
 
In summary, we can conclude that CEA incorporates health mobility on both the benefit 
and the cost side.  Given equal prevalence, curative programs favour groups with lower 
health  mobility,  because  benefits  are  greater.    For  prevention  programs  where 
implementation costs are not a function of the number of persons treated, CEA gives equal 
priority to groups with high and low mobility.  However, for prevention programs where Health mobility: implications for efficiency and equity in priority setting       K Hauck, A Tsuchiya 
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implementation costs are a function of the number of persons treated, CEA favours groups 
with lower health mobility because costs are lower.  We conclude that CEA does not give 
higher priority to groups with higher mobility, at least not for the scenarios considered 
above. 
 
Health mobility and equity 
 
What we have not considered so far is that fluctuations in health may  have associated 
societal values, over and above disutility generated by ill-health experienced by individual 
patients.  In the following section, we will consider under which conditions the equity 
aspect  of  health  mobility  should  be  reflected  in  resource  allocation  decisions.    Should 
fluctuations in health states be taken into consideration?  In particular, how can judgements 
be  made  on  the  question  which  group  is  worse  off:  the  one  with  high  or  low  health 
mobility? We argue that both of these questions are matters of social value judgement.  If 
policy decisions are to reflect the efficiency aspect of mobility only, then current practice of 
economic evaluation is fine.  However, if this is not the case, then the level of health 
mobility for the health problem in question and the extent to which it should count in the 
decision  making  process  need  to  be  established  and  incorporated  into  the  analysis  to 
achieve not only efficient but also equitable resource allocation.   
 
Let‟s assume for the following discussion that the general public should decide on whether 
or not the equity aspect of health mobility is to be considered in CEA.  If total disease 
burden is fixed, then high mobility is associated with shorter spells of illness for a larger 
group of people, and low mobility with  longer  spells  of  illness  for a smaller group  of 
people.  If the public is only interested in the level of total ill health and not how it is 
distributed, valuations for high and low health mobility would be the same.  This implies 
that differences in health mobility should have no impact on resource allocation decisions 
over and above the impact it has through standard CEA.   
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Now, let‟s assume that the public is not only interested in the level of total ill health, but 
also in how it is distributed over time across subgroups of the population.  In addition, we 
assume a situation where people can be either healthy or ill (and there are no births or 
deaths).  One possibility is that the public would regard lower health mobility of a subgroup 
as something that should be given higher priority to, when prevalence is the same.  In other 
words, if a given level of disease prevalence is distributed across a defined group through 
time, the public may prefer it to be dispersed widely so that more people suffer a short 
duration each (high mobility) than to be concentrated so that a smaller number of people 
suffer  a  long  duration  each  (low  mobility).    At  any  given  point  in  time,  low  mobility 
implies a lower probability of recovery to full health in the next time period than if health 
mobility were high.  Thus, the public may feel that patient groups experiencing low health 
mobility should receive greater compensation for their lower probability of leaving the ill 
state in the next time period.  For our example, this would imply that improving the health 
of  LIG  should  receive  a  higher  weight  relative  to  improving  the  health  of  MEG, 
considering that those in LIG suffer more persistence in their mental illness than MEG.  
This  will  be  in  addition  to  the  advantage  LIG  may  have  based  on  the  efficiency 
implications of health mobility. 
 
There is evidence to suggest that economic inequality across subgroups in society impacts 
on individual well-being, over and above the adverse effects of low income itself.  It has 
been found that individuals have a lower tendency to report themselves happy when income 
inequality is high, controlling for individual income, a large set of personal characteristics, 
and year and country (or, in the case of the US, state) dummies  (Alesina, Di Tella, & 
MacCulloch, 2004).  The authors point out that the impact is stronger in Europe than in the 
US, and they discuss the extent to which this may be explained in terms of perceived social 
mobility.    In  what  follows,  we  will  briefly  report  some  findings  from  two  small-scale 
exploratory studies conducted as preparatory work for the “NICE Social QALY Project” 
(Dolan, et al., 2008).  This project aimed at capturing and quantifying societal preferences 
for the relative value of health depending on the beneficiary. 
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In  the  exploratory  studies,  members  of  the  general  public  were  introduced  to  two 
hypothetical  equally-sized  groups  of  patients  (Group  A  and  Group  B)  with  different 
characteristics, one of which was „length of time with condition‟.  Scenarios were set up so 
that in each case, if respondents support a simple health maximisation principle then they 
would give priority to Group A, but if respondents regard the characteristic to be a relevant 
concern then they may sacrifice health maximisation and choose to give priority to Group 
B.  The objective of the first study was to find out why respondents supported deviation 
from simple health maximisation, if they do.  The objective of the second study was to 
identify the threshold at which each characteristic becomes a relevant concern (i.e. „how 
much time‟ the patient lived with certain condition).   
 
In the first study, Group A consisted of „patients who have had the condition for 2 years‟ 
and was expected to achieve a larger health gain, whereas Group B consisted of „patients 
who have had the condition for 10 years‟ and was expected to achieve a smaller health 
gain.  Sixteen individuals were recruited in Sheffield City Centre, and participated in four 
separate focus group sessions.  Given the small sample size and non-representativeness of 
the respondents, only qualitative results are reported here.  One view that was repeatedly 
expressed by several participants was that those who have had the condition for longer 
should be given priority even if this did not maximise health benefits because “they've 
waited that long […] they shouldn‟t have to wait any longer”.  However, there were also 
participants who felt that those who have had the condition for longer would have learned 
to live with it so that “you can live with it a bit longer, can‟t you”, and therefore did not 
need the treatment as much.  Although the scenarios used in the exercise did not give the 
specifics of the illness involved, some participants pointed out that the answer will have 
“quite a lot to do with the nature of the illness that we‟re dealing with”.   
 
In the second study, Group A consisted of „patients who got the condition recently‟ and 
was expected to achieve a larger health gain, whereas Group B consisted of „patients who 
have had the condition for 6 months‟ and was expected to achieve a smaller health gain.  
For those respondents who chose Group A, the length of time those in Group B had the Health mobility: implications for efficiency and equity in priority setting       K Hauck, A Tsuchiya 
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condition for was increased to 1 year, whereas for those respondents who chose Group B, 
this length of time was decreased to 3 months, and so on. There were three such path-
dependent sub-questions.  The distribution of respondents in terms of how long the wait 
needs  to  be  for  patients  in  Group  B  to  be  given  priority  over  those  in  Group  A  was 
identified, and the results were reported in terms of the quantitative trade off made by the 
median respondent.   
 
Forty-two  individuals  were  recruited  in  Sheffield  City  Centre  separately  from  the  first 
study,  and  participated  in  four  different  focus  group  sessions.    Given  the  non-
representativeness of the sample, the results should not be generalised.  The results were 
found to be sensitive to the size of the sacrifice in efficiency.  When the health gain for 
Group B was set at 90% of the health gain for Group A, one in seven respondents chose 
Group A (i.e. to maximise health  gain), whereas  the median respondent,  alongside the 
majority of respondents, chose to prioritise patients who have had the condition for longer 
even if it was by one month.  However, when the health gain for Group B was set at 50% of 
the health gain for Group A, a third of respondents chose to maximise health, while the 
median respondent chose to prioritise patients that had had the condition for one year or 
longer.   
 
Thus, the two studies have found evidence to suggest that depending on the context, at least 
some members of the public think that patient groups with low health mobility should be 
given priority even it this meant that some efficiency was sacrificed.  At the same time, the 
results  also  indicated that  this  may depend on  the nature of the  condition,  on whether 
patients had learned to live with the condition, on the actual lengths involved, and on the 
magnitude of the efficiency sacrifice.   (For further details on these exploratory studies, 
Dolan et al, 2008, should be consulted.)  In summary, we find that it is possible that the 
public is concerned with fairness in the distribution of health with respect to the length of 
time with illness so that the group with low mobility would receive greater priority than the 
group with high mobility, even where cost-effectiveness ratios are the same (as we have 
shown to be the case for some prevention programs).  These tentative results suggest that Health mobility: implications for efficiency and equity in priority setting       K Hauck, A Tsuchiya 
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the efficiency implication of health mobility on CEA (where they do exist) and the equity 
implication of health mobility on CEA (if they are to exist) both go in the same direction. 
 
Political implications of health mobility 
 
In the real world, resource allocation decisions by policy makers are influenced by many 
factors  and  not  only  the  outcomes  of  CEAs.    Health  mobility  can  have  political 
implications, which in turn may affect resource allocation decisions.  If health mobility for 
a  particular  illness  (e.g.  mental  illness)  among  a  subgroup  such  as  MEG  is  high,  this 
implies that - over several time periods - a comparably larger proportion of people in this 
subgroup is or will be affected by the illness than if health mobility were low.  A policy 
maker  (possibly  concerned  about  re-election)  may  want  to  allocate  larger  amounts  of 
resources to this subgroup than to another where mobility is lower.  This is because, over 
several time periods, a greater number of voters will be affected in the subgroup with high 
mobility.  This implies that the subgroup with high mobility may attract a larger amount of 
resources even if prevalence at one point in time is the same as in a subgroup with lower 
mobility.   On the other hand, an illness  or a subgroup  affected by an illness  which is 
characterized by low health mobility may be more conducive to the formation of patient 
organizations which require time and a relatively stable member base to become politically 
influential  (Patient  organization  movements,  2006).    It  has  been  shown  that  patient 
organizations and other non-state actors and networks can have a considerable influence on 
resource allocation decisions (Rabeharisoa, 2003; Tantivess & Walt, 2008).  This implies 
that the subgroup with low mobility would manage to attract a larger amount of resources 
even if cost-effectiveness ratios are the same as another subgroup with higher mobility.   
 
In summary, there may well be political implications of health mobility which influence 
resource allocation decisions, possibly in opposing directions.  They may make it difficult 
to implement the recommendations generated by CEA, especially if differences in health 
mobility between subgroups are large. 
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Conclusions 
 
In this note, we explore the concept of „health mobility‟, and whether it is relevant for 
resource allocation decisions.  We discuss whether and how health mobility is incorporated 
in cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA).  Obvious limitations of this initial discussion are that 
we  focus  on  simplified  treatment  programs,  we  assume  equal  costs  for  the  curative 
program, we distinguish only high and low health mobility (where it can be measured over 
several categories, and even continuously), and we can only present exploratory qualitative 
research  on  public  preferences  regarding  the  trade-off  between  health  mobility  and 
efficiency.  Still, we can derive some conclusions.  CEA does reflect health mobility in 
terms of efficiency.  Depending on the type of intervention, CEA either favours groups with 
lower health mobility or gives equal priority to groups with different levels of mobility.  
However,  CEA  does  not  take  into  account  the  equity  dimension  of  health  mobility.  
Qualitative research indicates that the public may be concerned with health mobility: some 
members of the public are willing to sacrifice health in order to give greater priority to 
patients who have had the condition for longer, i.e. those with lower health mobility.  If this 
is the case, health mobility needs to be incorporated into CEA to reflect the public‟s value 
judgements.  Further research is required to investigate the extent to which health mobility 
is a concern for the public, the conditions for which health mobility matters most, and to 
find ways of how the equity dimension of health mobility can be incorporated into CEA.   
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